Colombia's Neutrality during 1914-1918: An Overlooked Dimension of World War I by Rausch, Jane M.
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 X
IV
, 5
3 
(2
01
4)
, 1
03
-1
15
 Colombia’s Neutrality during 1914-1918: An 
Overlooked Dimension of World War I
Jane M. Rausch
University of Massachusetts Amherst, USA
Abstract: In the horrific conflict of 1914-1918 known first as “The Great War” and later 
as World War I, Latin American nations were peripheral players. Perhaps this lack of 
involvement explains why historians have paid scant attention to events in Latin America 
related to the war, but nevertheless, it is remarkable that Percy Alvin Martin’s account, 
Latin America and the War first published in 1915, remains the standard text on the topic. 
This essay partially redresses this omission by examining Colombia’s role in the war and 
its impact on the country’s development. These findings support Martin’s assertion that 
even those countries that were neutral in the Great War were not immune to its effects.
Key Words: World War I; Historical Revisionism; Colombia; 20th Century.
Resumen: Las naciones latinoamericanas fueron actores secundarios en el horrible 
conflicto de 1914-1918, conocido primero como “la Gran Guerra” y luego, como la 
Primera Guerra Mundial. Tal vez esa escasa participación explique por qué los histo-
riadores han prestado poca atención a los acontecimientos relacionados con la guerra en 
América Latina, pero, sin embargo, es notable que el libro de Percy Alvin Martin, Latin 
America and the War, publicado por primera vez en 1915, siga siendo el texto estándar 
sobre el tema. Este ensayo busca remediar esta omisión examinando el papel de Colombia 
en la guerra y su impacto en el desarrollo del país. Los resultados apoyan la tesis de 
Martin, según la cual incluso los países neutrales en la Gan Guerra no fueron inmunes a 
sus consecuencias.
Palabras clave: Primera Guerra Mundial; Revisionismo Histórico; Colombia; Siglo xx.
Introduction
Before it achieved its designation as World War I, the conflict of 1914-18 was aptly 
known to millions of Europeans as the “Great War.” Responsible for more than ten 
million deaths and twice that many seriously wounded, in concentrated destructiveness it 
surpassed anything in human history up to that time. The direct monetary cost has been 
estimated at more that 180 billion dollars and in the indirect financial cost (through prop-
erty damage and so forth) at more than 150 billion dollars. Immeasurable in Europe was 
the cost in broken lives, shattered societies, and the residue of hate and bitterness (Blum/
Cameron/Barnes 1970: 342).
Viewed from this perspective the war barely touched Latin America. For the first two 
and one half years all twenty Latin American nations remained neutral. Once the U.S. 
entered the conflict, Brazil and Cuba took an active part in the fighting; six more countries 
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—Costa Rica, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama— declared war; Peru, 
Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and the Dominican Republic severed relations with Germany; 
while Argentina, Chile, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, Paraguay, and Colombia main-
tained strict neutrality. 
This lack of direct involvement may explain why World War I is rarely discussed in Latin 
American historiography. In 1925 Percy Alvin Martin published Latin America and the War, 
an expanded version of a series of lectures he delivered at Johns Hopkins University four 
years earlier. What is remarkable is that after ninety years, Martin’s study, reprinted in 1967, 
remains the definitive work on the subject. Given the substantial economic and financial 
crises the war precipitated in Latin America and the realignment of global interests in its 
aftermath, it seems reasonable to conclude that this period deserves greater attention.
A case in point is the absence of the Great War in Colombian historiography. While 
numerous studies emphasize transformations that occurred in the 1920s after the conflict, 
virtually no attention has been paid to developments during the conflict. Bushnell in his 
widely-read survey, The Making of Modern Colombia: A Nation in Spite of Itself (1993) 
dismisses the war with a single sentence; Palacios in Between Legitimacy and Violence: A 
History of Colombia 1875-2002 (2006) devotes one page to the topic, while the most recent 
text in English, Colombia: A Concise Contemporary History by La Rosa and Mejía (2012) 
barely mentions the war. Studies of U.S. policy regarding Colombia such as Lael’s Arrogant 
Diplomacy: U.S. Policy toward Colombia (1987) are concerned almost exclusively with the 
taking of Panama in 1903, the building of the canal, and the subsequent battle in the U.S. 
Senate to ratify the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty in order to restore normal relations between the 
two countries. Tulchin’s more general survey, The Aftermath of War: World War I and U.S. 
Policy Toward Latin America (1971) contains only the briefest of references to Colombia.
Sources in Spanish are hardly more informative. Rivas in Historia diplomática de 
Colombia (1810-1934) (1961) includes a chapter on the diplomacy of the Concha, Suárez, 
and Holguín administrations, but his brief section on World War I is based almost entirely 
on information supplied by Martin in his previously mentioned book. Melo’s chapter,“De 
Carlos E. Restrepo a Marco Fidel Suárez: Republicanismo y gobiernos conservadores” 
in Volume 3 of the Nueva Historia de Colombia (1989) provides a good overview of 
domestic policies during this period but offers little information about the war. In his 
mammoth four-volume survey of Colombian diplomacy from the Wars of Independence 
to the present, La política internacional de Colombia (1997) Cavelier allots five pages 
to World War I. Perhaps the best source remains Mesa’s “La vida política después de 
Panamá,” in Volume 3 of the Manual de historia de Colombia (1980), but even here Mesa 
relies on Martin’s analysis for the basis of his discussion. 
The purpose of this study is to redress this gap by reviewing diplomatic developments 
between 1914 and 1918 in order to assess the role neutral Colombia played in the Great 
War and the impact of the conflict on the country. To explore these issues the essay will 
consider Colombia’s economic and political situation in 1914; the factors that contributed 
to its adoption of neutrality at the outbreak of the war; the country’s experience in the 
conflict before the U.S. declaration of war on Germany on April 6, 1917; its involvement 
in the war after that date until the armistice on November 11, 1918, and finally, the overall 
impact of the war on Colombia. The data suggests that a survey of developments during 
these years supports Martin’s assertion that even those countries neutral in the Great War 
were not immune to its consequences (Martin 1967: 2).
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1. Colombia in 1914
On August 7, 1914, when José Vicente Concha began his presidential term, the 
outlook for Colombia could not have been more favorable. Political peace had returned to 
the country after a series of devastating civil wars waged by the Liberal and Conservative 
Parties during the previous century. These struggles climaxed in the War of the Thousand 
Days (1899-1902), a conflict that cumulated in the decisive defeat of the Liberals. In addi-
tion, it widened a split between the National and Historical factions in the Conservatives 
and provoked the separation of Panama in 1903.1 National restoration began during the 
Quinquenio dictatorship of Rafael Reyes (1904-9) and was further consolidated by the 
election in 1910 of President Carlos E. Restrepo, the candidate of the Republican Union, a 
new political party committed to a program of bipartisan participation in government and 
laissez-faire economics. Restrepo continued Reyes’ policies of promoting export growth 
and selective protectionism for domestic industry that supported the interests of large 
landowners. Although the lack of a viable transportation system restricted international 
trade, the rise of coffee prices on the world market promoted the expansion of Colombia’s 
major export crop to meet growing demand in Europe and the United States (Melo 1989: 
III, 214-242). 
With regard to foreign policy the key issue facing the government was the resolution 
of its dispute with the U.S. over the loss of Panama, but it was not until after the election 
of President Woodrow Wilson in 1913 and the completion of the canal the following 
year, that negotiations began in earnest. Wilson was aware of the need for a final agree-
ment given Colombia’s proximity to the canal and the country’s growing importance as 
a potential source of oil. On April 6, 1914 he signed the Urrutia-Thomson Treaty by 
which Colombia recognized Panama’s independence, and the U.S. expressed “sincere 
regret” for its actions in 1903, paid Colombia a $25 million indemnity and granted it 
special privileges in using the canal. In May the Colombian Senators ratified the treaty 
after contentious debate being persuaded that whatever its defects, this arrangement with 
the U.S. would boost public finance, improve the country’s financial infrastructure and 
make Cartagena and Barranquilla more viable transit ports of inter-oceanic trade. It was 
expected that the treaty would quickly clear the way for renewed relations with the U.S., 
but the outbreak of World War I and the resistance of the U.S. Senate to the clause expres-
sing “sincere regret” delayed American ratification until 1921 (and only then with the 
deletion of the regret clause) (Palacios 2006: 66-67; Iriarte Núñez 1999: 725).
2. Factors contributing to the adoption of neutrality at the outbreak of the war
José Vicente Concha, a leading member of the Historical faction of the Conservatives 
won the presidency in 1914 backed by the official Conservative party machinery, the 
Catholic Church, and (somewhat surprisingly) Rafael Uribe Uribe, the leader of the 
Liberals, who believed he could influence Concha to insure that his party received fair 
1 The split in the Conservative party began in the 1880s when those labeled “Nationalists” supported the 
government in power while those who opposed it, regarded as more doctrinaire, were dubbed “Histori-
cals.”
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treatment (Puentes 1961: 564.) Although war had been declared in Europe three days 
earlier, Concha’s inaugural speech made no mention of it, but his selection of Marco Fidel 
Suárez as his Minister of Foreign Relations proved a fortunate choice. Suárez had served 
in the same capacity in previous administrations and had been one of the chief partici-
pants in the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty negotiations. Within and without Colombia he was 
well regarded as a distinguished authority on international relations and international law. 
His presence as foreign minister insured that Colombia would have an experienced and 
consummate diplomat during this critical time in world affairs (Martin 1967: 411).
The rapid expansion of the war caught not just Colombia but all the nations of the 
Western Hemisphere by surprise. By the end of August Germany and Austria-Hungary (the 
Central Powers) were fighting France, Belgium, Britain, and Japan (the Allies). Faced by this 
unexpected crisis the Latin American governments declared neutrality following the U.S. 
example. Colombians were especially aware of the potentially terrible consequences posed 
by this new conflict. Both the Germans and the Allies were major trading partners and had 
substantial investments within the country. Propaganda from both sides flooded Colombia 
often disseminated by local periodicals. With their admiration especially for French culture, 
Liberal and Republican newspapers tended to favor the Allies, while Germany had a cham-
pion in the fiery Conservative, Laureano Gómez who consistently supported their cause in 
his pro-clerical newspaper, La Unidad (Henderson 1988: 79).
Colombia’s declaration of neutrality reflected its historical pattern of international 
diplomacy and the firm conviction of Foreign Minister Suárez. In his noteworthy book 
Neutralidad y orden: política exterior y militar en Colombia 1886-1918 Esquivel Triana 
suggests that throughout the nineteenth century Colombian governments when facing 
international crises consistently sought resolution through arbitration and international 
justice, even when such a policy worked against their own national interests (Esquivel 
Triana 2010: 51). Although Esquivel Triana considers this stance as an example of 
political weakness with negative consequences, in 1914 it was a realistic reaction with 
regard to the European conflict. Thus, Suárez reiterated the formula adopted by Colombia 
during the War of the Pacific (1879-1883), and the Cuban-Spanish-American War (1898). 
Between August and October he proclaimed neutrality and imposed a series of resolutions 
concerning the belligerents that regulated the dispatch of boats, armaments and elements 
of war, provisioning of food and coal supplies, length of stay in Colombian waters, and 
the use of wireless stations (Rivas 1961: 656). In implementing these policies he was 
further guided by Article V of the Hague Convention adopted in 1907 which set out “The 
Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in case of War on Land.”2
3. The war between August 1914 and April 7, 1917
Neutrality meant that Colombia could no longer trade with any of the belligerent 
powers and led to an alarming budget crisis. Revenues fell in 1914 and 1915, recovering 
the following year, but falling again in 1917 and 1918. The closing of European markets 
and their partial replacement by the U.S. had an impact on all credit and mercantile 
2 Colombian delegates were signatures to the Hague Convention of 1907, and although it was not ratified 
by the Colombian Senate, Suárez nevertheless adhered to it.
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operations. In 1916 Minister of Hacienda Diego Mendoza reported that the rapid rise of 
the U.S. as a trading partner would have been unimaginable without the special circum-
stances of the war since the habit of buying English goods dated back to the colonial era 
(Palacios 2006: 68). Further complicating the domestic scene was the assassination of 
Rafael Uribe Uribe on October 14, 1914, a tragedy that left the Liberals without an effec-
tive leader and deprived President Concha of an important ally and spokesman among the 
loyal opposition.
In the meantime, a key concern of Minister Suárez’s was monitoring Colombia’s 
wireless stations based in the Atlantic ports of Santa Marta and Cartagena. The first 
belonged to the United Fruit Company (UFCO) and the second to a German company, the 
Gesellschaft für Drahtlose Telegraphie of Berlin. On September 1, Suárez issued a decree 
stating that Colombia’s policy of neutrality required that these stations might remain open 
only under the supervision of authorities in Santa Marta and Cartagena in order to insure 
that they did not transmit communications of a military nature. The United Fruit Company 
managed to operate its wireless station in accordance with this decree without interrup-
tion throughout the war although all ships entering the port were required to dismantle 
their radio antennas as long as they were in Colombian waters. The German station in 
Cartagena, however, was another matter. Faced with accusations by both the U.S. and 
Britain that it was already sending illegal messages, Suárez on November 19 ordered 
the company to remove all its Germans employees. Then on December 5 with the full 
consent of the German ambassador, Kracker von Schwartzenfeldt, he shut the station 
down completely for the duration of the conflict (Martin 1967: 414-416).
Suárez’s other concern in the early months of the war was to prevent Colombia’s 
highly partisan newspapers from making statements that might conceivably violate the 
policy of neutrality. Given that legislation protecting freedom of the press was quite 
Liberal, some journals launched violent attacks against the belligerents. Suárez sought to 
temper these outbursts in a circular dated November 17, 1914 addressed to the editors. To 
clarify the role which newspapers might play, he wrote that “the absolute freedom of the 
press does not mean the absence of duties or responsibilities.” Conceding that a state of 
“absolute” indifference was impossible, he exhorted the editors to express their sympa-
thies and antipathies “in the rational form of truth, in the respectful form of courtesy, and 
in the Christian form of benevolence” (Suárez 1918: 483-485). Repeated on several occa-
sions this warning was clearly necessary. Intemperate newspaper reports of the fighting 
in Europe did tend to inflame public opinion as was evident in Bogotá on December 15, 
1914 when police were called out to break up a fight between pro-German and pro Allied 
patrons at the Olympia Theater.3
Suárez made clear that Colombia did not embrace passivity as a neutral in the Great War. 
Along with a number of other South American leaders he believed that the countries in the 
Western Hemisphere should work together to escape immediate effects of the conflict and 
possibly mitigate some of the problems it was creating. With Suárez’s blessing, on May 24, 
1915 Santiago Pérez Triana, editor of the journal Hispania, and Roberto Ancízar, secretary 
of the Colombian Legation in Washington, participated in the first Pan-American Financial 
Conference that was meeting in Washington chaired by U.S. Treasury Secretary William G. 
3 “Colombia y el mundo, 1914”. In: <http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/
mayo2005/mundo1914.htm> (19.12.2013).
iberoamericana 53.indb   107 27/02/2014   14:05:17
108 Jane M. Rausch
Ib
er
oa
m
er
ic
an
a,
 X
IV
, 5
3 
(2
01
4)
, 1
03
-1
15
McAdoo. Delegates to this conference discussed issues regarding public finance, the mone-
tary situation, existing banking systems, extension of inter-American markets, the merchant 
marine, and improving transportation facilities. Their discussions went beyond reviewing 
emergencies caused by the war to considering the organization of a permanent hemispheric 
association that could deal with such problems as they arose. The delegates voted to establish 
an Inter-American High Commission, which was to begin its work at once, and represented 
a step toward the eventual creation of the Pan-American Union (Moore 1920: 343-344). 
Pérez Triana took an active role in the conference proposing in a well-received speech 
that the Monroe Doctrine be transformed into a multi-lateral tenet. Later in July when the 
Germans were intensifying U-boat attacks on passengers as well as commercial ships, he 
published a book of essays, Some Aspects of the War (1915) in which he was relentlessly 
critical of the German war effort. For example, in one essay entitled “Why a Spanish-
American should not be Pro-German,” he wrote: 
The tragedy of Belgium, attacked with cold deliberation and torn from limb to limb by the 
troops of his Majesty the Kaiser, has staggered humanity; it stands out against the horizon like 
a hellish vision of agony and of shame for the whole human race (Pérez Triana 1915: 176).
In the meantime, back in Bogotá the fiercely nationalistic Laureano Gómez was cham-
pioning the Central powers. In “The Convenience of a German Victory,” an editorial publi-
shed on December 13, 1915, he wrote: “Several times we’ve argued in this newspaper that 
Latin American nations should lean toward Germany in the present conflict, this because 
the victory of that nation would favor the autonomy and development of South American 
nations presently menaced by Yankee imperialism,” and he added that all the principal coun-
tries allied against Germany —England, Italy, and France— had in recent years abused 
Colombia and her sister republics (Gómez quoted by Henderson 1988: 79-80). 
In 1916 Suárez turned his attention to resolving long-standing border disputes. The inde-
pendence of Panama in 1903 did not end Colombia’s contacts with Central America as its 
Caribbean archipelago of San Andrés and Providencia lay within maritime boundaries claimed 
by Nicaragua and Honduras. When the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty was signed on August 5, 1914, 
the United States acquired the rights to any canal built in Nicaragua in perpetuity, a renewable 
ninety-nine year option to establish a naval base on the Gulf of Fonseca, and a renewable 
ninety-nine year lease to the Great and Little Corn Islands in the Caribbean (Stuart/Tigner 
1975: 501). In full knowledge that this treaty impinged on territory claimed by Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, and Honduras, the U.S. Senate ratified the treaty on February 18, 1916 disre-
garding formal protests from those countries. Suárez was likewise concerned since the treaty 
jeopardized Colombia’s control of the two Mangles islands that formed part of the San Andrés 
Archipelago. During the nineteenth century Nicaragua had challenged Colombia’s claim to 
some of the islands off the Mosquito Coast, and eventually the two countries had agreed to ask 
the president of France to arbitrate their dispute. In 1900 the French issued a laudo that left the 
Islas Mangles under Colombian rule. Fortified by this decision, Suárez instructed the Legation 
in Washington to protest the Bryan-Chamorro Treaty, which seemingly violated Colombia’s 
territorial rights. That the U.S. refused to recognize Colombia’s claim only added to the frus-
tration over its Senate’s failure to ratify the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty (Suárez 1957a: 59-60).
Suárez achieved more success in settling long-standing issues over the delineation 
of Colombia’s borders with its neighbors. The Suárez-Muñoz Vernaza Treaty signed on 
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July 15, 1916 and ratified by both Ecuador and Colombia on January 26, 1917 established 
a mutually acceptable frontier extending for 586 kilometers between the two countries 
(Rivas 1961: 667). Negotiations over the 2, 219 kilometer border with Venezuela proved 
to be more contentious, but on November 3, 1916 Suárez signed with Demetrio Losada 
Díaz the Suárez-Losada Díaz Treaty agreeing to submit the dispute to Switzerland for 
arbitration (Zea Hernández 1989: 99-102).
It was also in February 1916 that Suárez, addressing a group of journalists, enlarged upon 
his doctrine known as Respice polum or Estrella Polar (Pole Star) that he first introduced 
during the Thomson-Urrutia negotiations in 1914. In addition to being an internationalist 
and a supporter of Pan-Americanism, Suárez was also a positivist who had a realistic idea of 
the dominant role the United States was destined to play in the Western Hemisphere in the 
twentieth century. In Respice polum doctrine he argued that it was necessary to look to the 
“pole” because luck would follow the people within its economic and international orbit. That 
“pole” was the United States, which by its geographic position, political and industrial organi-
zation, and advanced technology was found to have a great influence in the world. President 
Wilson had emphasized that North America would be indispensable in the reconstruction of 
Europe and would be equally important in the development of the Latin American countries. 
Suárez believed that Colombia must embrace new relationships with the U.S. because lacking 
economic resources and international influence, it was not possible for it to remain isolationist 
(Torres del Río 2010: 55). When in July Suárez defended this doctrine before the Congress, the 
opposition denounced him as a traitor to Colombia, but he held fast to this idea throughout his 
political career, and given the steady incursion of U.S. interest into Colombia during and after 
the Great War, he was merely being pragmatic (Sánchez Camacho 1955: 138-140).
4. The War between April 6, 1917 and November 11, 1918
On February 7, 1917 President Wilson severed relations with Germany, and on April 8 
Congress declared War. Wilson hoped that the remaining neutral countries in the Western 
Hemisphere would follow the U.S. example but only eight eventually declared war, while 
five others broke relations with Germany. Choosing to remain neutral were Colombia, 
Argentina, Chile, Mexico, El Salvador, Venezuela, and Paraguay. An editorial published 
in El Tiempo on April 18, 1917 thoughtfully set out the reason for Colombia’s decision. 
It observed that while the German submarine offensive was despicable, unlike Brazil and 
the U.S. Colombia had not suffered any losses from that campaign nor had it any specific 
complaint to rise against the Central Powers. The other countries that had followed the 
U.S. by declaring war or breaking relations had little choice being virtual protectorates of 
that nation. The editorial continued:
Colombia, more than any other country in America, needs to emphasize its personality and 
independence against Yanqui power, not in a hostile way, which would be foolish and absurd, 
but by refusing to become part of the states controlled by Washington which is what would 
happen if we broke relations with a friendly people that has not harmed us in any way except 
by becoming an enemy of the U.S.4
4 El Tiempo, April 18, 1917.
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It concluded that the paper was solidly on the Allied side, but to declare war without 
any reason would be “the most tragic page in our history and expose us to the well-de-
served scorn of all of Latin America”.
Despite this rationale, Colombia’s staunch neutrality and refusal to follow the U.S. 
into the conflict left it open to charges that it was plotting with Germany. In March 1917 
the revelation that Germany’s Foreign Minister Arthur Zimmerman had sent a telegram 
to Venustiano Carranza, president of Mexico, proposing an alliance sparked accusations 
from some American newspapers that Colombia was somehow involved in the scheme. 
According to the New York American, evidence had been laid before President Wilson 
and his cabinet of a secret alliance between Germany and Colombia “having as its object 
the capture or destruction of the Panama Canal in the event of war between the U.S. and 
Germany”.5 Colombia’s ambassador Julio Betancourt immediately issued a statement that 
persistent reports of an alliance between Colombia and Germany “are absolutely false”6. 
In Bogotá on March 30 Suárez sent an urgent telegram to governors of the departments 
declaring that there was not the least foundation for this rumor, and on April 19 he again 
issued guidelines for the national press emphasizing the importance of moderation in the 
publication of articles referring to the war (Suárez 1957b: 251; 253).
Colombians who favored the Allied cause were offended by allegations of a secret 
pact with Germany, and they were horrified by the steady reports detailing the ruthless 
cruelty of the submarine campaign. When Germany first announced the policy of unres-
tricted submarine warfare, Suárez himself wrote to Ambassador von Schwartzenfeldt on 
February 16, 1917 stating that the methods proposed by Germany were calculated to 
aggravate rather than mitigate the horrors of the war and that “as for the effects which 
in determined cases these methods and practices may have upon the rights of Colombia, 
her government reserves the right to protest against them and demand the justice which 
may be due her” (Suárez 1957b: 313). On October 17, 1917 the Colombian Senate after 
a stormy debate approved a resolution fully supported by Archbishop Bernardo Herrera 
Restrepo declaring that the use of submarines against any kind of vessel whether neutral 
or belligerent was a practice contrary to international law and that submarines should not 
be admitted into Colombian ports and other jurisdictional waters of the republic (Barrett/
Pérez-Verdía 1919: 13).
Despite these actions rumors of a Colombian-German alliance continued to circulate 
until the end of the war. In December 1917 the German writer, Alfredo Hartwig wrote in 
Deutsche Rundschau, that next to Mexico, Colombia had the greatest reason to desire the 
triumph of Germany. He added, “It is no wonder that this country publishes with satis-
faction the communications of the German general staff and that even the simple Indian 
people listen to the illuminating reports from Germany when they are publicly read in 
the market place. The progress of the German offensive is greeted with the greatest joy” 
(Hartwig quoted by Martin 1967: 422). Even during the Versailles Peace Conference on 
January 24, 1919 the Associated Press published a news bulletin that accused Colombia of 
aiding the Germans by permitting them to use its Caribbean islands as bases for provisio-
ning submarines, a charge which the then Foreign Minister Pedro Antonio Molina imme-
diately denied (Holguín y Caro 1957: 597).
5 New York American, March 3, 1917.
6 New York American, March 7, 1917.
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America’s entry into the war raised Colombia’s distress over the safety of its ports, 
renewed anxiety about the activities of the wireless stations and intensified its trade with 
the U.S. With regard to the first matter U.S. Secretary of State Robert Lansing reassured 
Suárez on April 17 that while American and allied ships would patrol the Colombian, 
Venezuelan and Ecuadorian coasts to protect them from the submarine threat, no American 
force had or would disembark on Colombian soil (Suárez 1957b: 253).
Concerning activities of the wireless stations, Suárez affirmed in a circular to the 
governors dated April 26, 1917 that Colombia would continue to follow the Hague 
Convention in this matter. He reported that since it was not possible to monitor the acti-
vities of the radiotelegraph station on San Andrés, it had been removed and at that time 
communications with the islands were conveyed solely by maritime mail. Stations in 
Arauca and Orocué in the eastern plains had never functioned because they depended 
on English-made equipment that could not be assembled due to lack of expertise. The 
German-owned station in Cartagena remained suspended, and messages sent by the 
United Fruit Company from Santa Marta were strictly limited to commercial topics. All 
ships that entered Colombian ports were required to lower their telegraph antennas, but 
after captains of UFCO boats complained that this stipulation cause unnecessary compli-
cations some allowances were being made specifically for the company (Suárez 1957b: 
260-261).
Trade with the U.S. had become more complicated. In order to organize an army of 
more than a million men prepared to fight overseas, the American government placed 
severe restrictions on exports of any goods that might be needed by the military, and it 
announced that because most of its ships would be required to transport these troops, 
it would suspend all commercial shipping to Colombia. Duly alarmed the Colombian 
Legation worked to mitigate the impact of these pronouncements by obtaining special 
licenses to continue shipments of materials critical to national and commercial needs. 
In addition the Foreign Minister protested to “high American functionaries” that if the 
policy was enforced, Colombia, left without any means of transport, would be unable to 
send coffee to the U.S., its major trading partner. Apparently his arguments were convin-
cing for American officials assured him that “traffic and commerce with Colombia would 
be maintained in the best conditions that circumstances would allow” (Holguín y Caro 
1957: 594). In the end the worst feared disruptions did not occur, but trade throughout the 
Caribbean Basin was noticeably curtailed when the U.S. government requisitioned ships 
from the United Fruit Company, a measure that caused a dramatic decrease in bananas and 
other exports (Bucheli 2005: 31).
Colombia continued to supply the U.S. with coffee, but an unanticipated development 
was the surging demand for platinum mined in the western coastal territory of Chocó by 
the American-owned Chocó Pacífico Company. Until 1917 Russia had been the Allies’ 
principal supplier of this heavy metal which as a good conductor of electricity and a 
powerful catalyst was critical for military purposes, but events generated by the October 
Revolution of that year led to an 84 percent drop in its production between 1914 and 1918. 
With Russia eliminated, Colombia became the largest producer in the world averaging 
1,460 kilograms a year between 1916 and 1924. In 1913 Colombia had provided only 9 
percent of U.S. needs but by 1918 it was supplying over half (Leal León 2009: 161-62; 
Palacios 2006: 70).
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Throughout this period Colombia’s domestic economy was severely restricted. With 
the exception of the textile industry centered in Medellín, other sectors were hobbled by 
a lack of circulating currency, the loss of tariff revenues and the drop of imports. In 1915 
Congress had passed Ley 57 known as the Ley Uribe, which regulated health standards in 
factories, and in 1918 it passed Ley 46 mandating hygienic housing for workers (Archila 
1989: 232). These tentative measures, which echoed the aims of the Catholic idea of 
social justice as already proclaimed by Pope Leo XIII in his encyclical Rerun novarum of 
May 15, 1891, did nothing to regulate the abysmally low wages, inflated prices and food 
shortages.7 Thus it was not surprising that in January 1918 port workers in Barranquilla 
went on strike demanding higher wages and the protests spread to Santa Marta and even 
the United Fruit Company. By January 24 order was restored along the Atlantic coast, 
but the movement sparked the organization of the first Colombian trade unions and set 
the stage for larger and more violent strikes in the decade to come (Urrutia 1969: 57-60).
The social unrest bubbling under the outward calm came to the fore with the presi-
dential campaign that began in late 1917. Marco Fidel Suárez was the official candidate 
sponsored by the National Conservatives and the Catholic Church. His opponents were 
Guillermo Valencia, a candidate of the Historical Conservatives and José María Lombana 
Barraneche representing the Liberal. Suárez’s unswerving support of the Thomson-Urrutia 
Treaty had made bitter enemies of the Historical conservatives who were led by Laureano 
Gómez, who blamed Suárez and the Nationalist of betraying Colombian patriotism. The 
animosity between the two men helps to explain the vicious nature of the campaign. The 
Conservative political machine supported by the Catholic Church took an active part in 
the battle accusing Valencia of leading a radical Masonic movement and ordering people 
not to vote for him because he had been ex-communicated. The opposition stumped the 
country accusing Suárez and the Nationalists of ruining Conservatism. Violent incidents 
attend the campaign, and on February 4, 1918 there was even a thwarted attempt to assas-
sinate Gómez in the Egipto Barrio of Bogotá (Henderson 2001: 107.)
The Suárez candidacy aroused such opposition that when outgoing President Concha 
was asked what he took most pride in during his four years in office, he replied “that it 
was keeping the army from shooting into the crowds protesting the election of February 
11, 1918!” (Conche quoted by Henderson 2001:107). The official results of the ballo-
ting declared Suárez as the winner, and the Colombians now had at their helm, a man 
who believed that the U.S. rather than Europe would be the future leader of the Western 
Hemisphere and that Colombia would need to combine American capitalism with the 
doctrine of the Catholic Church. As Marco Palacios has suggested, “This recipe of Catholic 
social doctrine and Yankee progress would put its stamp on ‘progressive conservatism’ for 
the rest of the century” (Palacios 2006: 69).
In his inaugural speech addressed to Congress on August 7, 1918 Suárez affirmed 
that Colombians would hold fast to Concha’s policy of neutrality, but he qualified this 
assertion by stating that “neutrality was not the same as indifference,” and that it would 
not keep the government from the “frank manifestation of its opinions where they were 
demanded by the need to support the guiding principals of law”.8 His appointment of 
7 Rerum Novarum issued by Pope Leo XIII was an open letter to all Catholic bishops dealing with the 
“Rights and Duties of Capital Labor.” It specifically addressed the condition of the working class and 
condemned unrestricted capitalism.
8 El Tiempo, August 9, 1918.
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Jorge Holguín y Caro as minister of foreign relations likewise reflected an increasing 
awareness that the Allies would be victorious in the Great War, for Holguín had been the 
author of the October 1917 Senate resolution protesting the German submarine campaign. 
In addition, a month before his inauguration, Congress passed another resolution congra-
tulating France on the celebration of its national anniversary, and a British diplomatic 
mission arrived in Bogotá in time for the inauguration with the principal object of explo-
ring commercial possibilities in Colombia (Barrett/Pérez-Verdía 1919: 13; Holguín y 
Caro 1957: 654-658).
On November 11, 1918 El Tiempo published the long-awaited news that an amnesty 
had been signed. The Great War was over. German had surrendered, but for Colombia and 
the rest of the world, the cessation of fighting did not stop one of the conflict’s most deadly 
aspects — the 1918 “Spanish” flu pandemic involving the H1N2 influenza virus. Before 
it had run its course, the virus infested 500 million people throughout the world, killing 
50 to 100 million of them to make it one of the deadliest disasters recorded in human 
history. In Colombia between June and December 1918, 30,000 people died of “la gripa” 
including six thousand in Bogotá.9 President Suárez was personally devastated for besides 
grieving for the stricken Colombians, his beloved son Gabriel, a youth of 18 studying 
electrical engineering in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania succumbed to the flu on October 14, 
1918 and was buried a week later in New York (Sánchez Camacho 1955: 157).
Conclusion
What role did Colombia play in the Great War and what was the impact of the conflict 
on the country? As a neutral nation its participation in the conflict was minimal. Colombia 
did not send any soldiers or ships to fight in Europe. It did, however, monitor its Atlantic 
islands and ports to make sure that their radiotelegraph stations were not being used to 
aid the belligerents, and once the U.S. entered the war, it supplied the Allies with strategic 
materials such as platinum. It actively fostered stronger ties between the Latin American 
countries, and in the aftermath of the war it gained membership in the League of Nations 
and a larger role on the world stage.
The impact of the war on the country was far more substantial. In spite of being 
neutral, Colombia lost 30,000 citizens to the ravages of “Spanish” flu. The loss of 
European markets thrust Colombia directly into the U.S. economic empire. Economic 
dislocation caused by the war forced the abandonment of vital transportation and infras-
tructure projects, delayed modernization on numerous fronts, and unleashed discontent 
among the popular classes that produced violent and bloody strikes in the 1920s. 
The most negative impact, however, was that the war provided the U.S. Senate with 
an excuse to delayed ratification of the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty in spite of continual 
urging for its passage by Presidents Concha, Suárez, and Wilson, and businessmen in 
both countries. The Senate’s repeated refusal to act added to the resentment felt by many 
Colombians over the U.S. role in Panama’s declaration of independence in 1903, and once 
9 “Colombia y el mundo, 1918”. In: <http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/revistas/credencial/
sept2005/mundo1918.htm> (19.12.2013)
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America did enter the war, this understandable hostility was seen outside the country as a 
legitimate reason to support the German cause.
The Panama question roiled Colombian politics setting Conservatives against one 
another and against Republicans and Liberals. President Suárez who had virtually staked 
his entire career on the treaty’s passage was forced to resign before the end of his term 
without achieving this goal and under accusations of malfeasance coming from members 
of his own party. When the Senate finally did ratify the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty during 
the administration of Suárez successor, Pedro Nel Ospina, the $25 million indemnity 
that it brought to cash-starved Colombia created a bonanza known as the “Dance of the 
Millions.” Swept along by the political, economic and social dynamics restrained by the 
war but unleashed after the armistice, Colombia belatedly but decisively entered the twen-
tieth century.
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